Aspects of general aviation flight safety research by Gratton, GB & Bromfield, MA
RAeS GA Conference 2008; Gratton and Bromfield on safety research 1
Aspects of General Aviation flight safety research 
 
G. B. Gratton  
M.A. Bromfield 
 
Brunel Flight Safety Laboratory 
School of Engineering and Design 
Brunel University 
Uxbridge, Middlesex, UB8 3PH, United Kingdom 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
The largest cause of General Aviation Accidents is shown through an analysis of the 
283 UK fatal accidents between 1980 and 2006 to be loss of control, most usually at 
low level.  Evaluating the reasons behind this, it is shown to be due to a combination 
of aircraft characteristics and pilot situational awareness and response.  The statistical 
analysis also shows that there are marked differences in the incidence of these 
accidents between some aircraft types, and this along with systems analysis and 
simulator experimental work has been used as a mechanism for researching how and 
why these accidents occur.  A proposed mechanism is described, along with an 
ongoing programme of research, centred on certain single engined aeroplanes, aiming 
to investigate this and produce recommendations both for aircraft design and pilot 
training. 
 
NOMENCLATURE 
 
CFIT Controlled Flight Into Terrain 
GA General (light) Aviation 
GASCo General Aviation Safety Council 
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
KIAS Knots Indicated Airspeed 
LoC Loss of Control 
LPO Long Period Oscillation 
LSS Longitudinal Static Stability 
MAC Mean Aerodynamic Centre 
POH Pilots Operating Handbook 
SPO Short Period Oscillation 
VFR Visual Flight Rules 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A subject which cannot avoid attention in General Aviation is that of safety, and in 
particular the avoidance of fatal accidents.  Whilst it is potentially appealing to 
attribute one, or a small number of, cause(s) to any accident, in practice the number of 
events which can lead to any accident is large, and can stretch back many decades 
before the accident occurrence. 
 
Consider, for example, the following hypothetical timeline for an accident, which 
occurs at T=0: 
 
T-25 years, accident aeroplane is designed and built
T-10 years, pilot is trained on a different aircraft type
T-10 months, latest safety data is prepared
T-9 months, previous annual servicing of aeroplane
T-10 days, pilot last flew
T-18 hours, latest NOTAMs prepared
T-9 hours, latest weather forecast prepared
T-2 hours, pilot carries out flight planning
T-45 minutes take-off
T-5 minutes, prepare for landing
T-20 seconds, final decision to land
And then what????????
 
Figure 1, Hypothetical accident timeline 
 
This complex timeline is intended to illustrate that there are numerous points at which 
factors can be introduced which might have led to this accident.  This of-course is to 
be determined by a subsequent investigation, but highlights the validity of Reason’s 
classic “Swiss Cheese” model of accident causality1.  However, the Swiss Cheese 
model (conventionally applied to human factors failures, but equally applicable to all 
accident causal factors), which would describe each event as a layer of cheese 
containing holes – under normal circumstances when these events are laid upon each 
other, there is no co-incidence of holes right through the pile of cheese but, 
occasionally, all of these holes will line up allowing sight through the pile – where 
each hole is an error, then it is only when all of the holes line up that an accident can 
occur. 
 
However, holes in the layers of hypothetical Swiss cheese are inevitable, and the only 
way to genuinely ensure perfect aviation safety is to ensure that the aircraft cannot 
possibly be flown, such as the aircraft shown in Figure 2 below. 
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Figure 2,  Brick-built biplane at Old Warden Airfield 
 
The improvement of aviation safety therefore, is about identifying the holes in each 
cheese slice, and then a combination of eliminating them, or ensuring that these holes 
do not line up. 
 
2. FINDING THE HOLES IN THE CHEESE 
 
GASCo, the UK General Aviation Safety  Council, have recently conducted a study 
into the history and causal factors behind UK General Aviation fatal accidents 
between 1980 and 2006 – a 27 year study.  One of the objectives of this has been to 
identify the major causes behind these accidents; whilst this study has not to date been 
published in whole, a summary of the provisional conclusions is shown in Figure 3 
below. 
 
The study reviewed all 283 fatal accidents for UK-registered aeroplanes under 5,700 
kgs.   It highlighted that stall/spin was a factor in nearly all fatal accidents and also the 
marked variation in stall/spin susceptibility of different aircraft types. 
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Figure 3,  primary attributed causal factors, UK GA fatal accidents 1980-2006 inclusive 
 
Considering this information, it can be seen that the largest proportion of fatal 
accidents involve loss of control – either in visual or instrument conditions: totalling 
33% of accidents.  It is likely that the proportion of LoC related accidents is greater 
than that, since this is likely to also include a proportion of low flying/aerobatic 
fatalities also.   
 
However, having established that LoC – which for present purposes will be equated 
with the stall/spin event, is the most common factor identified in fatal accidents, this 
only progresses the question forwards one step.  The important question then becomes 
one of why these LoC events are occurring?. 
 
In order to explore this, a useful starting point has been to separate out the two certain 
LoC categories (LoC in VFR and LoC IMC), and then further break down these 
accidents by other factors.  One which has been particularly useful has been to break 
down these LoC accidents by aircraft type, and then to determine the number of LoC 
related fatal accidents per 100,000 flying hours per type.  Whilst it is difficult to be 
definitive in drawing conclusions due to the (thankfully) small statistical sample, there 
are strong indications of differences between types.  One which has been particularly 
striking has been the difference between the Cessna 150 and Cessna 152 aircraft 
 
The C150 (0.68 fatals per 100,00 hours flown) falls approximately on the average for 
stall/spin related fatal accidents in the UK GA fleet (0.65 fatals per 100,00 hours).  
Alternately however, the C152 (0.05 fatals per 100,00 hours flown), which has despite 
being an extremely common type only suffered one stall spin related fatal accident 
during the period of the study, shows an extremely low accident rate.  It was the 
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researchers’ opinion that this apparent difference – between the  Cessna 150, and the 
Cessna 152 presented an extremely appealing research opportunity. 
 
 
3.  POTENTIAL CAUSES OF LOSS OF CONTROL 
 
Consideration of the various aspects of a light aircraft flight, there are two ways in 
which one can classically consider the risk of an accident.  The first is a commonly 
published model suggesting workload and pilot capacity through the various phases of 
the flight; an example is shown at Figure 4 below.  
 
 
Figure 4, Classical pilot workload demand and capacity model2 
 
This model, which is somewhat empirical but nonetheless widely used and respected, 
indicates that during two phases of flight in particular: the take-off, and the approach 
and landing, there is a relatively small available excess pilot capacity.   
 
Another approach is to consider the basic flight mechanics of each mode of flight, and 
in particular the margin from the stall – that being the classic LoC event.  By simple 
inspection, unless the aircraft is deliberately subjected to an unusual manoeuvre such 
as low level aerobatics, the margin from the stall is least during the take-off, and the 
approach and landing, phases of flight. 
 
Unsurprisingly, accident statistics show that these two phases of flight are indeed 
those where over 50% of LoC accidents occur3. 
 
4. A PROPOSED MODEL FOR LOSS OF CONTROL OCCURRENCE 
 
 
Inappropriate pilot actions (wrong actions) or inactions (failure to perform any action) 
can result in an LoC.   Pilot Induced Oscillations (PIOs) are an extreme case of 
inappropriate pilot actions, whereby pilot control inputs and aircraft response outputs 
are dangerously out of phase with one another causing pronounced oscillations.  
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Gray4 and later Warren5, introduced a useful concept whilst intended for application 
to PIOs, may also help in our understanding of LoC in a wider context. 
 
Offering a simplistic explanation of this model – consider task of riding a bicycle 
along, for example, a white line along the road within a tolerance of 150mm either 
side.  This is not particularly difficult and most people would be prepared to try this, 
and would probably succeed.  However, consider alternately the task of riding the 
same bicycle along the top of a 300mm wide wall.  This changes the task in two 
important ways; firstly failure to succeed in this task now carries a substantial 
personal risk to the rider, and secondly that instead of the rider trying to follow a 
median condition (the white line) he or she is now instead trying to avoid two 
boundaries (the edges of the wall).  This principle introduces two new concepts: 
 
(i) Tracking point – the optimal condition which the pilot is trying to 
maintain. 
(ii) Boundary – the condition which must not be crossed. 
 
In piloting terms, a comparable situation would be the initial climb out after take-off: 
in this case the tracking point would be the aircraft’s initial climb speed as given in 
the POH, whilst in the nose-up sense one boundary would be the stall condition.  To 
understand the dynamics of this, consider the model shown in Figure 5 below. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5, Proposed model for boundary tracking 
 
This model essentially shows two different control loops which may potentially exist 
within the aircraft control task.  The loop which compares the tracking point to the 
actual condition is a classical negative feedback loop which is attempting to drive the 
pilot/aeroplane combination back to the optimal condition (convergent).  The second 
loop however compares the actual to boundary condition and is a positive feedback 
loop driving the pilot/aeroplane combination away from the boundary (divergent).  In 
practice neither will be a simple relationship, but the combination of negative and 
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positive feedback loops within the same system presents a duality of the pilot trying to 
maintain an optimal condition, and avoid a dangerous condition, offers a useful way 
of considering how a LoC may occur. 
 
As an aside, it should be borne in mind that either a tracking point, or a boundary, 
may not exist; this is illustrated in Table 1 below. 
 
Type of task Example Tracking point Boundary 
Tracking point only Following a 
navigational route 
Route heading - 
Boundary only Taking off from a 
runway with no 
centreline marking 
- Runway edges 
Tracking point + 
boundary 
Taking off from a 
conventionally 
marked  runway 
Runway centreline 
markings 
Runway edges 
Table 1, comparison of tracking point and boundary tasks 
 
For the present safety investigative purposes, the first case, of tracking point only, is 
of limited interest since no obvious safety boundary exists.  So, the second and third 
cases are those of interest – the difference between them being the existence, or not, 
of the tracking point. 
 
Analytically, it is relatively straightforward to identify the tracking point, actual 
condition and boundary condition, using some convenient variable such as airspeed, 
angle of attack, or lateral runway position.  From these the condition error and safety 
margin can be determined.  The important issue then is to develop an adequate 
understanding firstly of the aircraft’s characteristics and how they translate these 
quantities into perceivable cues, and secondly how the pilot under the extant 
circumstances (which will certainly include workload/stress factors such as noise, 
procedural requirements, communications requirements, monitoring of other aircraft 
conditions, and so-on) will perceive and respond to those cues.  So,  this problem 
becomes a combined one of engineering (the mapping of condition error and safety 
margin to cues) and human factors (the alteration of these cues to pilot response).  
This paper is concerned with the likelihood of a departure from controlled flight, so 
the safety margin/cues and associated response become the subject of primary 
interest, and the condition error/cues and associated response a modifier. 
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5. APPLICATION OF THE LOSS OF CONTROL MODEL TO THE CESSNA 
PARADOX 
 
The marked difference in safety records of the C150 and C152 which, as can be seen 
in Figure 6 below are extremely similar aeroplanes, offers the researcher an 
opportunity to develop and evaluate the LoC occurrence model described above.  
Starting from the assumption that the accident statistics accurately show the C152 as 
an aircraft which is very resistant to the risk of departure from controlled flight, and 
the C150 as one which displays an average risk – it is then useful to compare the 
characteristics of these aeroplanes.   
 
Cessna A150M 
 
 
Cessna 152 
Figure 6, visual comparison of C150 and C152 aeroplanes 
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 Cessna 150 Cessna 152 
Gross Weight (lbs) 1600 1670 
CG Range (inches) 31.5~37.5 31~36.5 
Elevator Range (deg) +25/-15 +25/-18 
Aileron Range (deg) +20/-14 +20/-15 
Flap Range (deg) 0~40 0~30 
Stall Speed with Full 
Flaps & Rear CG (KIAS) 
46 36 
Table 2, Main differences between C150 and C152 aircraft 
 
The key design differences of note between the Cessna 150 and 152 are Gross 
Weight, CG range and Location mainly due to the larger and heavier 108 and 110 hp 
Lycoming engines fitted to the Cessna 152.   The Cessna 152 also has more 
downward elevator and aileron authority in addition to a limited flap range of 30 
degrees. 
 
Figure 7, Comparison of CG Envelopes for Cessna 150 and Cessna 152 (MTOW) 
 
Under a typical loading condition (MTOW), there is 1.5” difference between CG 
locations - Figure 7, Comparison of CG Envelopes for Cessna 150 and Cessna 152 
(MTOW).   Future flight tests and modelling are necessary to obtain further research 
data for comparison and validation. 
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6. RESULTS SO FAR 
 
Flight tests were conducted in the Cessna 152 earlier in the year.   The relevant flight 
tests with regard to key design differences were:- 
• Apparent Longitudinal Static Stability (LSS) Stick-fixed & stick-free in 
the Cruise at different CG settings; 
• Longitudinal Aircraft Dynamics including Short Period Oscillation (SPO), 
Phugoid (LPO), Dutch Roll, Spiral Mode & Roll Mode; 
• Stall in different Configurations of CG, Flap & Power Settings 
 
The Apparent LSS provides important information with regard to the apparent static 
stability of the aircraft.   Theory suggests that the Cessna 152 is marginally more 
stable in pitch than the Cessna 150.   The tests allow determination of the stick-fixed 
and stick-free neutral points, a measure of stability. 
 
Aircraft dynamics testing provide an indication of the dynamic stability of the aircraft 
types.   Manufacturer’s information suggests that the Cessna 152 requires more entry 
with full rudder and elevator to enter a spin and then more likely to spiral than spin 
with forward CG loadings.   Stall tests provide insight into the slow-speed handling 
qualities of the aircraft. 
 
Qualitative characteristics leading up and at the stall are observed for different CG 
positions, configurations and power settings.  Warning cues, speeds and stall speeds 
are determined. 
 
All tests were repeated in the flight simulator to enable the aircraft simulation model 
to be refined for appropriate flying qualities and handling characteristics.   The 
development of the simulation model is an iterative process and requires particular 
attention to detail.  For example, stick forces in pitch need to accurately reflect the 
real aircraft.  The simulator uses an artificial feel-system ‘q-Feel’ to replicate control 
forces and provide tactile cues to the pilot. 
 
 
7. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESEARCH AND OUTPUT OBJECTIVES 
 
The next step in the research is to complete the flight test programme for the Cessna 
Case Study.   The flight test programme will enable additional research data to be 
gathered to meet two key objectives:- 
 
• Assessment and comparison of the apparent performance and handling 
qualities of both aircraft types (flight dynamics); 
• Assessment of the utilisation of boundary/point tracking cues in a selection of 
typical loss of control scenarios. 
 
For the aircraft performance and handling, additional tests for the Cessna 152 in 
different CG positions will be performed and then replicated for the Cessna 150L & 
M models for comparison and subsequent simulator model development.   Apparent 
LSS, Longitudinal Dynamics and Stall tests as indicated in Section 6, will be 
executed. 
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For boundary/point tracking, simulation tests using the refined aircraft model will be 
conducted to gather additional research data using volunteer GA pilots.  Before any 
tests are conducted a detailed questionnaire will be prepared and necessary ethical 
reviews conducted to ensure subject health & safety as well as data protection and 
confidentiality. 
 
The simulation tests will be based on typical loss of control scenarios as identified by 
earlier research and confirmed by the questionnaire.   The proposed situations to be 
considered are shown in Table 3 below:- 
 
Phase of Flight 
 
LoC Scenarios 
Take-off • Shortfield Takeoff, with risk of either terrain impact 
or stall. 
• Engine Failure After Takeoff (EFATO), with risk of 
stall. 
Circuit • Base to Finals turn, with risk of stall. 
Approach and 
Landing 
• Approach, with risk of either undershoot or stall. 
Go-around • Go-around with full flap & full power, with either 
failure to climb above terrain, or stall. 
Table 3, Proposed Loss of Control Scenarios 
 
 
In the future, it is proposed to extend the research into other aircraft types where 
marked differences in safety statistics are also apparent (e.g. slab wing vs straight 
wing PA-28). 
 
The end result will be a broader understanding of the characteristics surrounding a 
loss of control and the essential factors to consider to avoid safety-critical boundaries.   
It is planned to publish this within the aircraft operating, training and design 
communities, specifically the Aeronautical Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society 
(RAeS) and the Journal of Aircraft of American Institute of Aeronautics & 
Astronautics (AIAA).   This it is hoped, will help primarily to improve safety with 
existing aircraft aswell as make future aircraft more resistant to these life-threatening 
situations. 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In any flying situation, a pilot is continually multi-tasking, balancing tasks, priorities, 
time and safe limits of operation.   The pilot is using a combination of point tracking. 
boundary tracking and piloting skills to position the aircraft correctly for safe flight.   
At critical points, such as the takeoff, approach & landing, safety-critical boundary 
limits for the specific aircraft type and peak pilot workload come together forming a 
potentially dangerous situation.   Sensory cues act as the critical link between the 
aircraft response and the pilot inputs.   Using a combination of theory, simulation and 
actual flight testing, safety critical Loss of Control (LoC) scenarios are being critically 
analysed to better understand these situations. 
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The end result will be a broader understanding of the characteristics surrounding LoC  
and the essential factors to consider to stay within the safe range of operation.   It is 
planned to publish this within the aircraft operating, training and design communities.   
This, it is hoped, will help primarily to improve safety with existing aircraft as well as 
make future aircraft more resistant to these life-threatening situations. 
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